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SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS AND SHAREHOLDER 
ACTIVISM: THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL MEETING OF 
SHAREHOLDERS
An appropriate division of power between the board of directors and share-
holders of the company is quintessential for the success of the company. However, for 
a long period of time the monitoring powers of the shareholders were limited. Re-
cently, both the European and the national member states’ legislators refined corpo-
rate law and allocated more (monitoring) powers in the hands of the (general meet-
ing of) shareholders. This paper addresses in a comparative perspective the powers 
of the general meeting in five countries. First, the power of the shareholders that is 
provided through the European company law directives is briefly described. Next the 
“national” powers of (1) ordinary general meetings and (2) extra-ordinary meetings 
are addressed and compared. Third, the law in action is used to analyse the develop-
ments of shareholder rights and shareholder activism and to discuss whether the law 
and regulations provide in the appropriate shareholders rights.
Key words: General meeting. – Shareholder rights. – Voting. – Attendance.
1. INTRODUCTION
Shareholder monitoring and shareholder activism is at the heart of 
the corporate governance debate. It is considered as a fundamental com-
ponent balancing the powers of the board and of the shareholders. The 
issue is not very new. Ever since corporate law was developed, questions 
were raised as to how to divide the power between boards and sharehold-
ers, quintessential for the corporation that exists in part to facilitate dele-
gated decision-making.1
 1 R. Kraakman et al., Anatomy of Corporate Law, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford 2009, 72.
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Shareholders generally occupy a central position in company law 
all over Europe. Investors put money at risk in a venture and use the cor-
porate form to legally structure the business. As consideration for their 
investment, the investors receive shares, which make them shareholders. 
These shares provide the shareholder a bundle of shareholder rights. 
Shareholders will make use of these rights to protect their investment. 
Easterbrook and Fischel note:
“Shareholders are the residual claimants to the firm’s income. 
Creditors have fixed claims, and employees generally negotiate compen-
sation schedules in advance of performance. The gains and losses from 
abnormally good or bad performance are the lot of shareholders, whose 
claims stand last in line. As the residual claimants, shareholders have the 
appropriate incentives (collective choice problems notwithstanding) to 
make discretionary decisions...The shareholders receive most of the mar-
ginal gains and incur most of the marginal costs. They therefore have the 
right incentives to exercise discretion. And although the collective choice 
problem prevents dispersed shareholders from making the decisions day 
by day, managers’ knowledge that they are being monitored by those who 
have the right incentives, and the further knowledge that the claims could 
be aggregated and votes exercised at any time, leads managers to act in 
shareholders’ interests in order to advance their own careers and to avoid 
being ousted”.2
This theory still stands today notwithstanding some scholars have 
criticized its incompleteness. Black provides an overview of the interests 
of other corporate constituents, explaining why these constituents have no 
voting rights.3
For a long period of time the shareholders – acting together in the 
general meeting of shareholders – were considered the supreme and final 
decision makers of the company. The shareholders controlled all powers 
which were not vested in other bodies of the company. The shareholders 
were – and still are today – presented at the top of the diagram represent-
ing the company.4 Shareholders are seen as “owners” of the company. 
However shareholders own the shares, not the company. When sharehold-
ers become numerous and the ownership of the shares is constantly chang-
ing, the allocation of all powers in the hands of shareholders and general 
meeting becomes inefficient. Today the residual powers shifted to the 
board of directors and the general meeting of shareholders can only vote 
 2 F. Easterbrook, D. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge 1996, 67–68.
 3 Black refers to the wide distribution of the residual interests, the costs and na-
ture of the residuals claimant. Other distributions of formal control rights will be less ef-
ficient (B. Black, Corporate Law and Residual Claimants, Working Paper, http://eschol-
arship.org/uc/item/5746q7pj#page-1, last visited 1 December 2011).
 4 Until 1973 the Belgian Companies Act stated explicitly that the general meeting 
had all the residual powers which were not vested in the board of directors.
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on the issues that the law or the articles of association are willing to al-
locate to the decision making power of the general meeting. As long as 
corporate issues cannot or are not subject to a vote, the right to vote is of 
limited value.
The shareholders’ meeting is not deprived of all powers. In most 
countries the (general meeting of) shareholders are in charge of the elec-
tion of the board of directors, a number of other recurrent corporate items 
and the “fundamental decisions” of the corporation. In one textbook it 
sounds: “In any case, however, it is the general meeting that decides on 
fundamental matters, such as the alteration of the articles, including the 
objects of the company, the transformation of the company into another 
legal person and its winding up.”5
The objective of this paper is to comparatively examine the role of 
the general meeting of shareholders and relate this role to the attendance 
and voting turnout of shareholders and identify the drivers for sharehold-
er attendance. That is, we examine whether the AGM can play the role it 
is given in the new corporate governance framework.
2. THE POWERS OF THE GENERAL MEETING OF 
SHAREHOLDERS
2.1. The European Harmonisation Efforts
In many corporate law textbooks the position of the general meet-
ing is addressed in a strictly formal way. In a large comparative research 
project on the efficiency of voting systems, Eckbo, Paone and Urheim 
started the analysis of the general meeting with the time and power to 
convene the meeting, the notification date, the techniques to provide the 
notice, and the content of the notice and the agenda. The paper continued 
with the right to put items on the agenda, the distribution of information, 
the criteria for participating and voting at the general meeting, how share-
holder can vote at the general meeting. Finally the work ends with the 
quorum and majority requirements, the functioning of the meeting and 
the distribution of information after the general meeting.6 The analysis 
does not come as a surprise in light of the legal developments of share-
holder rights for which the European Shareholder’s Directive 2007/36/EC 
 5 A. Dorresteijn et al., European Corporate Law, Kluwer Law International, Al-
phen aan de Rijn 2009, 193.
 6 B. Eckbo, G. Paone, R. Urheim, Efficiency of Share-Voting Systems – Report on 
Italy, Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2009–64, July 2009, 183; B. Eckbo, G. 
Paone, R. Urheim, Efficiency of Share-Voting Systems – Report on Sweden, Tuck School 
of Business Working Paper No. 2010–79, August 2010, 226.
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serves as an illustration.7 The directive aims “to allow shareholders ef-
fectively to make use of their rights throughout the Community”.8 The 
Directive requires that companies provide in a timely manner information 
on the time and the place of the meeting, that shareholders have a right to 
put items on the agenda, that shareholders do not have to deposit their 
shares prior to the meeting, that shareholders have a right to ask questions 
and vote by proxy and that companies disclose the voting results. How 
major the step forwards towards more shareholder democracy was, the 
shareholder directive does not empower shareholders with more control 
rights.
The agenda items upon which the shareholders are empowered to 
vote are not identical in the different countries. To assess the monitoring 
behavior of shareholders it is necessary to study which items the general 
meeting of shareholders are according to the law subject to a vote, when 
these matters come up to a vote, how these matters come up to a vote and 
how the topics are approved or rejected. We address the first two ques-
tions.
First it is necessary to identify the rights of the general meeting of 
shareholders. The European harmonization efforts of company law failed 
to focus on the internal organization of the company. In the nineteen sev-
enties the European Commission started a debate to harmonize the inter-
nal structure of the company through the proposal of the fifth company 
law directive. It was considered that the two-tier system was superior but 
the Commission recognized that one-tier systems provide characteristics 
that in certain situations can be tolerated. The proposals were modified 
during the discussions over the next years but finally, as it became obvi-
ous that both systems had their merits and shortcomings, the European 
Commission withdraw its proposal.9 Many of the discussion topics had 
been picked up in other developments like corporate governance and 
freedom to (re)incorporate. As a result the harmonization efforts vis-à-vis 
the position and power of the general meeting of shareholders ended with 
the provision of mandatory approval rights of a limited number of reor-
ganizations of the company.
Table 1 provides an overview of the rights of the general meeting 
of shareholders in the different company law directives. It is of impor-
tance to note that the field of application of the directives can differ. The 
 7 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, PBL No. 184, 
14 July 2007, 17. 
 8 Considerans 14 of the Directive 2007/36/EC.
 9 The developments regarding the proposal of the fifth but also of all other direc-
tives are recently and orderly provided in A. Dorresteijn et al., European Corporate Law, 
Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan de Rijn 2009, 39–93.
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second, third and sixth company law directive as well as Directive 
2005/56/EC is applicable to all public limited liability companies while 
the takeover directive, the transparency directive and the shareholder 
rights directive is only applicable to companies which have their shares 
traded on a regulated market and in Directive 2006/43/EC the articles dif-
fer from one another in the field of application.
The second company law directive which emphasizes the protec-
tion of creditors of the company via the minimum capital rule and the 
maintenance of capital provides in the intervention of the general meeting 
when the capital is modified. First, when the company acquires assets of 
the founders of the company outside the normal course of business short-
ly after incorporation, the acquisition must be submitted for the approval 
of the general meeting.10 The rule was promulgated to avoid founders to 
first establish the company and subsequently circumvent the procedures 
for considerations in kind. In 2006, the requirement was further softened 
when transferable securities are contributed as consideration. The protec-
tion of capital is further strengthened via the intervention of the general 
meeting of shareholders when the company decides to undertake any kind 
of the reduction in the subscribed capital,11 as well as for distributions to 
shareholders through the acquisition of its own shares.12 Both can be used 
as tunneling techniques that the European Commission wanted to pro-
hibit.
Next, the position of the incumbent shareholders can be signifi-
cantly influenced if the company issues new shares.13 Incumbent share-
holders will have to vote on the decision to increase the capital or to 
empower another company organ to take the decision to increase the cap-
ital. The general meeting will also have to decide if the preemptive rights 
of the incumbent shareholders can be waived. The European Commission 
considered these shareholder rights as very important and requires the 
general meeting of shareholders to take these decisions with a majority of 
not less than two thirds of the votes attached to the securities or the sub-
scribed capital. The supermajority rule can be waived when at least half 
of the subscribed capital is represented. It is obvious that this procedure 
makes calls for capital in the European Union more complicated.
The second company law directive also requires the approval of the 
general meeting to wind up the company in case of serious losses or to 
decide whether any other measure should be taken in place thereof.14
 10 Article 11.
 11 Article 30.
 12 Article 19.
 13 Article 25.
 14 Article 17.
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The election of the auditor is a current item of the agenda of the 
general meeting in all European countries in this study in line with article 
37 of Directive 2006/43/EC. However, this directive allows countries to 
provide in alternative systems if this system does not impair the auditor’s 
independence from the executive members of the board or management 
board. Next, it should be noted that although the shareholders elect the 
auditor, it is the board that governs or monitors the selection procedure. 
Finally, the right to dismiss the auditor is not explicitly granted to the 
general meeting of shareholders. The Directive only requires that the dis-
missal is based on proper grounds and excludes the divergence of opin-
ions on accounting treatments or audit procedures as proper grounds.
Mergers and divisions of companies require the fiat of the general 
meeting of shareholders. The regulatory requirements can be found in the 
third directive for (national) mergers, in the sixth directive for divisions 
and in Directive 2005/56/EC for international mergers. As for the capital 
requirements, the European Commission provided for specific majorities 
approving these types of restructuring. In many countries several types of 
mergers and acquisitions are distinguished and the involvement of share-
holders is also required in case all the assets of the company are trans-
ferred.15
The European Union empowered the general meeting of sharehold-
ers to frustrate a takeover bid. If the board of directors considers the bid 
to be inappropriate it requires prior authority of the general meeting of 
shareholders before taking any action resulting in the frustration of the 
bid. However, in order to pass the takeover directive the European Com-
mission compromised that the Member States can authorize the board of 
directors not to apply the condition that the general meeting must approve 
the defensive mechanism. The opting out of the Member States had to be 
combined with an opting-in system for the individual companies.
The Transparency directive protects the investors’ community by 
regulating the information that companies listed on a regulated market 
must disclose. The use of electronic means to distribute information is 
allowed if it is approved by the general meeting. The transparency direc-
tive also refers to the general meeting in case of the amendment of the 
articles of association. Article 19 of the Directive states:
“Where an issuer proposes to amend its instrument of incorpora-
tion or statutes, it shall communicate the draft amendment to the compe-
tent authority of the home Member State and to the regulated market to 
which its securities have been admitted to trading. Such communication 
shall be effected without delay, but at the latest on the date of calling the 
general meeting which is to vote on, or be informed of, the amendment”.
 15 See for example in the German Umwandlungsgesetz and the Dutch Book 
2:107a. In the latter case the transfer of the company or the transfer of “as good as” the 
whole company requires shareholder approval. 
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It considers that the changes of the statutes requires at least the 
general meeting of shareholders to be informed about all amendments, 
but more in general, that the general meeting is to vote on any amend-
ments. The vagueness of the article suggests that many other issues re-
garding corporate life and the position of the general meeting of share-
holders have not been harmonized at the European level. We will discuss 
next how national corporate law empowers the shareholders of listed enti-
ties.
Table 1: Rights of the general meeting of shareholders according
to the European company law related directives.
Directive article power of general meeting
second company law directive article 11 approve acquisition of non-
cash assets from founders
second company law directive article 17 decide winding up in case of 
serious loss
second company law directive* article 19 acquire own shares (excepti-
on for serious and imminent 
harm)
second company law directive article 25 (1) decide an increase of capital
second company law directive article 25 (2) authorize other body to
decide on capital increase
second company law directive article 25 (3) waive pre-emption rights
second company law directive article 30 decide on reduction in the 
subscribed capital
third company law directive 
(codified in directive 2011/35/
EC)
article 6–7 decide on merger
directive 2005/56/EC article 6 decide on cross-border
merger
sixth company law directive article 4–5 decide on division
directive 2006/43/EC article 37 appointing auditor
take over directive article 9 empower board to frustrate a 
bid (but MS can waive)
transparency directive article 17–18 techniques of conveying
information
transparency directive Article 19 Indirectly: change of
instrument of incorporation 
or statute
* as amended by directive 2006/68/EC
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2.2. The Position of the General Meeting of Shareholders in National 
Member States
The general meeting of shareholders (AGM) serves as a corporate 
body to obtain the consent of the shareholders for decisions that do not lie 
within the managerial discretion of the board of directors. Aforemen-
tioned we briefly discussed which issues the European Union considers 
as outside the discretion of the board of directors. For the remainder, it is 
up to the national legislators to consider these issues which should be 
inside and outside this discretion. We studied the national company legis-
lation of five European member states and identified the powers of the 
general meeting of shareholders. Table 2 indicates the powers of the gen-
eral meeting of shareholders according to the Companies Code of Bel-
gium, the Code de Commerce for France, Book 2 Civil Code for the 
Netherlands, the German Aktiengesetz and the Companies Act of 2006 for 
the UK. We identified and classified other powers than the “European” 
powers referred to in table 1. We have separated the issues we considered 
as current items (table 2) and non-current items (table 3). This classifica-
tion is somewhat arbitrary as some current items are only scheduled for 
approval by the AGM biennial, triennial or multiannual while some non-
current items are de facto scheduled annually. The division is based on 
the legal requirement that the general meeting recurrently have to ap-
prove the item or not. As an example, we can refer to the French case of 
approving contracts between board members and the election of auditors. 
The latter decision is recurrent but the articles of association of the com-
pany can provide for a term of up to six years. The former item only re-
quires a decision of the AGM if a contract between the board member and 
the company is entered into, but in practice almost all AGMs of large 
listed entities must approve some of this kind of contracts every year.
A first look at table two already illustrates that common agenda 
items are rare. The approval of the annual financial statements serves as 
a good example. In Belgium and France the general meeting must ap-
prove the financial statements. In the UK the accounts and reports are 
approved by the board and signed by a director after which both the ac-
counts and reports are “laid before” the general meeting.16 The German 
management board must submit the accounts and the report to the super-
visory board that reviews both the accounts and the report. This proce-
dure results in the “adoption” of the accounts.17 The management and the 
supervisory board are allowed to take the decision that the “adoption” of 
the accounts is left to the AGM.18 The Dutch board must sign the ac-
 16 Section 414 and 437 UK Companies Act 2006.
 17 Section 171–172 UK Companies Act.
 18 Section 173 UK Companies Act.
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counts while it is the power of the AGM to “adopt” the accounts.19 The 
report is only provided to the shareholders. The French AGM has to “re-
ceive” the report of the board and to “deliberate and decide on all ques-
tions that relate” to both the accounts and the consolidated accounts.20 
The latter accounts are separately voted. In Belgium, the shareholders 
have to “hear” the annual report and “to treat” the accounts. The AGM 
must approve the accounts.21
Some countries empowered the general meeting to decide on the 
allocation of the profit and the dividend. France has the most extensive 
provisions with respect to the procedure of the approval of the financial 
statements. After the accounts have been approved the French AGM has 
to approve the allocation of income and the dividend. The general meet-
ing has the power to decide to fully or partially distribute the dividend in 
shares.22
In some countries the approval of the accounts is accompanied with 
the decision of the general meeting to discharge the directors.23 The deci-
sion to discharge the directors limits claims against the directors for 
breach of duty which is disclosed in the annual accounts and report. Ac-
cording to article 554 of the Belgian Companies Act, the general meeting 
of shareholders must vote on the discharge of the directors and the audi-
tor. While discharging the directors can be found in other countries, like 
Germany and the Netherlands, where the general meeting of shareholders 
discharges both the members of the management board and the members 
of the supervisory board,24 discharging the auditor seems to be a unique 
power of the Belgian general meeting. In the UK it is neither provided in 
the Companies Act to discharge the directors, nor is it practiced. A deci-
sion of the UK AGM to discharge the directors would even be void.25 
However, the UK provides for a case-based but broader (non-current) 
exception. The general meeting of shareholders can ratify the behavior of 
a director which would give rise to liability for negligence, default, breach 
of duty or breach of trust in relation to the company unless there are ad-
 19 Book 2:101 Dutch Civil Code.
 20 Article L225–100 French Commercial Code.
 21 Article 554 Belgian Companies Code.
 22 Article L232–18 French Commercial Code.
 23 For a detailed comparative overview see S. Cools, “Europe’s Ius Commune on 
Director Revocability”, European Company and Financial Law Review 2/2011, 199–
234.
 24 Section 11 the German Aktiengesetz. In the Netherlands the law only provides 
that the adoption of the accounts cannot be qualified as a discharge of the directors or the 
supervisory board members. As a consequence Dutch companies provide in a separate 
agenda item to discharge the directors and supervisory board.
 25 Section 232 UK Companies Act.
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ditional legal requirements.26 The French commercial code does not pro-
vide for the discharge of the directors, nor is it practiced. Contrary to 
section 239 CA 2006, the French Civil Code states in article 1843–5 that 
no decision of the general meeting can prevent a claim against the direc-
tor for any kind of breach of duty.
As we referred to the non-current UK item of ratification of direc-
tor’s misbehavior we must make note of the Belgian and German law 
empowering the general meeting of shareholders to start a claim against 
(supervisory) board members.27 French law provides this power to indi-
vidual shareholders or groups of shareholders and explicitly denies the 
general meeting of shareholders the power to intervene.28 In the Nether-
lands, claims against directors are organized according to the rules ap-
plicable for conflicts of interest.29 Where appropriate, and unless the arti-
cles of association do not provide for an alternative procedure, the super-
visory board represents the company.30 However, the general meeting of 
shareholders has always a right to elect another person to represent the 
company.
The election and dismissal of directors is considered to be one of 
the most important duties of the general meeting of shareholders. How-
ever the right of the general meeting to elect and revoke board members 
has been curbed in a number of ways.31 First, many countries have a 
mandatory or optional two-tier board system. If a two tier system is 
adopted, the division of powers between the general meeting of share-
holders and the supervisory board is more complex. In Germany, the su-
pervisory board has as most important legal duties the appointment, su-
pervision, and removal of members of the management board. The gen-
eral meeting of shareholders elects the supervisory board but, in compa-
nies with more than 2,000 workers, half of the supervisory board mem-
bers are labor representatives appointed by representatives of the employ-
ees, in accordance with the codeterminations laws. In companies with 
500 to 2,000 employees, one third of the board members are employee 
representatives. In France32 and the Netherlands, the supervisory board is 
 26 Section 239 UK Companies Act.
 27 Section 147 German Aktiengesetz; including the auditors in Belgium (Article 
561 Belgian Companies Act). 
 28 See Article L 225–253 French Commercial Code
 29 G. Van Solinge and M.P. Nieuwe Weme, Rechtspersonenrecht – Deel II De 
naamloze en besloten vennootschap, Kluwer Deventer 2009, 446, 551.
 30 Book 2:146 Dutch Civil Code.
 31 This is also the case in the US. For an overview of the election procedure in the 
US see M. Ventoruzzo, “Empowering Shareholders in Directors’ Elections: A Revolution 
in the Making”, European Company and Financial Law Review 2/2011, 105–144.
 32 And the company has opted for a two tier board.
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elected by the general meeting,33 but in case the Dutch company is a 
structuur-NV,34 the power of the general meeting to elect the members is 
significantly restrained.35 The supervisory board selects its own members 
and the employees’ council must provide an opinion. The general meeting 
of shareholders only has a recommendation right with respect to the nom-
ination of members. Even this recommendation right is limited, as one 
third of the members on the election list must be recommended by the 
employees’ council. Next, the general meeting appoints the proposed can-
didates. In case the majority of the meeting votes against the election and 
this majority also represent at least 1/3 of the company’s capital, a new 
meeting can be called. In case the candidate is neither appointed nor re-
jected with the required majority, the supervisory board may itself ap-
point the member.36 The election right of the Dutch general meeting can 
be further restrained by the articles of association. The French supervi-
sory board of listed entities must be composed of one or more representa-
tives of the employees in case the employees hold more than 3 per cent 
of the capital.37 Also the articles of association can provide for a right for 
employees to have one or more representatives elected. The number of 
employees’ representatives must not exceed four or one third of the 
number of other members.38
The supervisory board elects the members of the board of directors 
of a German Aktiengesellschaft, a Dutch structuur-NV, as well as the French 
members of the executive committee. In a two-tier board structure of a 
Dutch non structuur-NV the general meeting retains the power to elect both 
the management board and the supervisory board. The articles of associa-
tion can restrict the freedom to elect the members and allow in specific 
nomination rules (binding nominations). However, it is possible for the 
general meeting to overrule this limitation via a supermajority vote.
In most countries the general meeting of shareholders elects the 
board members of the one-tier board. However binding nominations are 
common in the Netherlands.39 Similarly it is not uncommon to provide in 
nomination rights for large shareholders in the articles of association of 
Belgian companies. However the election right of the shareholder might 
 33 Article L 225–59 French Commercial Code.
 34 It is a specific regime for large companies. These companies must mandatory 
adopt a two tier board structure. 
 35 Book 2:162 Dutch Civil Code.
 36 Book 2:158 Dutch Civil Code.
 37 Article L 225–71 French Commercial Code.
 38 Article L 225–79 French Commercial Code.
 39 B. Santen, F. Kloosterman, “Bad governance of goede bescherming? – Benoe-
ming van bestuurders en commissarissen in de niet-structuur-beursvennootschap”, Tijd-
schrift voor Ondernemingsbestuur 2/2007, 49–56.
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not be too much scooped. In the UK the articles can provide in detailed 
appointment processes according to the Companies Act, but provision 
B.7.1. of the Combined Code requires that directors of FTSE 350 compa-
nies must be subject to annual election by shareholders and all other direc-
tors should be subject to election by shareholders at the first annual general 
meeting after their appointment. The Companies Act provides individual 
votes for directors of public companies.40 The articles of association of 
French boards can provide the right for employees to elect up to five direc-
tors but not more than 1/3 of the total number of other board members.41
The general meeting of shareholders is free to remove directors 
from office. This is the case in the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
France. Section 168 and 169 of the UK Companies Act requires a special 
notice of a resolution and provides the right for directors to be heard, 
while the French and the Belgian Supreme Court consider the right to 
dismiss directors as a right of public order.42 The requirement to provide 
in a special notice and hearing protects the interests of the directors but 
limits the power of the general meeting which hardly can make use of its 
right to dismiss the director pending the meeting. Under Belgian law, the 
general meeting does not have to provide any reason for its decision to 
dismiss the director, nor does the company have to pay any damages. In 
France the revocation of a director must not even be announced in the 
agenda but can be decided pending the meeting.43 For removing Dutch 
board members, the articles of association may provide for supermajority 
requirements not exceeding two thirds of the represented votes and half 
of the capital.44
In two-tier boards the right to dismiss the board is more regulated. 
In the Dutch structuur-NV the supervisory board dismisses the manage-
ment board but the general meeting of shareholders has the right to be 
heard.45 The German general meeting can even issue a vote of no-confi-
dence which the supervisory board can use to revoke the management 
board member. In the Netherlands, a similar procedure exists for the 
members of the supervisory board. The general meeting has the right to 
issue a vote of no-confidence on the supervisory board members sup-
ported by more than half of the votes at a meeting of shareholders where 
more than 1/3 of the capital is represented.46 It results in the automatic 
 40 Section 160 Companies Act.
 41 Article L 225–27 French Commercial Code.
 42 Cass. 13 April 1989, Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsrecht 1989, 878; Tijd-
schrift voor Rechtspersoon en Vennootschap 1989, 321, nt. Wyckaert and Bouckaert.
 43 Article L 225–105 French Commercial Code.
 44 Book 2:134 Dutch 2 Civil Code.
 45 Article 162 Book 2 Dutch Civil Code.
 46 Book 2:161a Dutch Civil Code.
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revocation of all supervisory board members. In that case, the manage-
ment board must summarize the Enterprise court to provide in one or 
more supervisory board members.47 In France, the supervisory board 
elects the members of the management board. However, the general meet-
ing of shareholders is empowered to dismiss the members of the manage-
ment board.48
Related to the right to “hire and fire” the members of the board of 
directors is the right to determine the remuneration of the board. When 
the company has a one-tier board the general meeting of shareholders sets 
the board fee. The law can explicitly empower the general meeting of 
shareholders to provide in an appropriate remuneration, like in France or 
implicitly, like in Belgium. In two tier boards, the remuneration of the 
supervisory board is generally set by the general meeting of shareholders, 
while the supervisory board sets the remuneration of the members of the 
management board. This is the case in Germany where according to sec-
tion 113 Aktiengesetz, the general meeting determines the remuneration 
of the supervisory board, unless it is set in the articles of association. The 
supervisory board determines the aggregate remuneration of a member of 
the management board. Both the supervisory board and the general meet-
ing must take care that a “reasonable relationship” exists between both 
the duties of the board members and the condition of the company.
In most countries, the role of the shareholders in the determination 
of the remuneration of the board members is strengthened. Although these 
items can be considered as non-current, since remuneration policies or 
severance payments are not issues that always need a yearly shareholder 
approval, we decided to discuss these issues together with the election 
and remuneration of the board. In the UK and Belgium, the general meet-
ing of shareholders must approve the remuneration report.49 The report 
must contain information of both the remuneration policy as well as the 
total fee that the members of the board of directors receive. When the 
report is voted down, the remuneration of the directors must not be repaid 
but the company has to consider another remuneration policy. On top of 
this voting right, both the Belgian and the UK’s general meetings have an 
additional voting right. The UK general meeting must approve director’s 
service contracts of more than two years,50 whereas the Belgian meeting 
must approve severance pay packages of more than 12 months of execu-
tive board members, members of the management board and officers in 
charge of the day-to-day management.51
 47 Section 84 par. 3 German Aktiengesetz.
 48 Article L 225–61 French Commercial Code.
 49 Hence, it must be considered as a current agenda item.
 50 Section 188 UK Companies Act.
 51 Article 554 Belgian Companies Act.
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In the Netherlands only the remuneration policy requires a share-
holder vote. The German general meeting of listed entities can be em-
powered to vote on the remuneration system of the members of the man-
agement board. The vote is not binding and the members of the supervi-
sory board must guarantee the appropriate remuneration of the manage-
ment board. The French Commercial Code has a different approach re-
garding director’s remuneration. It assimilates the decision of the remu-
neration package to a conflict of interest between the company and its 
board member and requires a similar procedure. We will discuss this deci-
sion as a non-current agenda item next.
Specific rules have been issued with respect to incentivising board 
members and senior executives with shares and share options. In 2010, 
Belgium introduced a complicated remuneration system related to the 
variable remuneration of executive directors and senior executives and 
the granting of shares and share options, which must be deferred for at 
least three years. Fifty per cent of the variable remuneration of executive 
directors and senior executives must be deferred for two to three years.52 
However, the general meeting of shareholders is granted the right to devi-
ate from both the requirement for deferred variable remuneration and the 
deferred vesting of shares and share options.53 The articles of association 
can also depart from the legal requirements, and altering the articles of 
association requires the general meeting’s consent.54
For sake of completeness, we add that only Belgian law explicitly 
empowers the general meeting of shareholders to determine the remu-
neration of the auditor.
Table 2: Overview of current powers of the general meeting
in five European countries
Belgium France Germany The Netherlands UK
one tier two tier
current items
approve annual
financial statements x x (x***) (x) (x) (x)
 52 Article 520ter Belgian Companies Act 
 53 For an analysis of this system see H. De Wulf, C. Van der Elst, S. Vermeesch, 
“Radicalisering van corporate governance-regelgeving: remuneratie en transparantie na de 
wet van 6 april 2010”, Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsrecht 10/2010, 909–963.
 54 The difference between the two alternatives is twofold. First, deviations that the 
general meeting approves are only valid for one program while the articles of association 
can be applied for each program. Second, the modification of the articles of association 
requires the intervention of a notary, a specific quorum and a supermajority approval. 







allocation of income x x
approve the dividend x x x x*
elect and revoke 
board of directors x x x x

































severance pay for 
board members or 
senior executives
x
Share and share price 
related
incentive scheme
x x x (LSE)
approve service




discharge the liability 
of directors (related to 
the disclosed
information)
x x x x
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ratify conduct by a
director amounting to 
negligence, default, 
breach of duty (or 
waive a claim)
x x
start a claim against 
directors (in name and 
on behalf of the
company)
x x (x) (x) x
discharge the liability 
of supervisory board x x
discharge the liability 
of auditors x
TOTAL OF ITEMS 11 9 13 10 11 9
Source: own research based on the analysis of the Belgian Companies Act, the French 
Commercial Code, the German Aktiengesetz and Handelsgesetzbuch, the Dutch Civil Code 
(Book 2) and the UK Companies Code 2006 and LSE listing requirements;
*: delegation of power is possible; ** removal requires supermajority; ***: only if required 
by boards or supervisory board did not approve the accounts
Table 3 provides a summary of the non-current decision rights of 
the general meeting of shareholders in five Western European countries. 
First, in some countries the general meeting is provided with specific 
rights regarding transactions between corporate incumbents and the com-
pany. Since 2007, the UK Companies Act requires the general meeting’s 
approval for substantial property transactions with directors. “Substan-
tial” transactions are transactions of assets with a value of either 100.000£ 
or 10% of the company’s balance sheet and more than 5.000£.55 Simi-
larly, the UK general meeting must approve a (quasi-)loan to a director as 
well as any kind of guarantee or a provision of security in connection 
with a loan to a director. Other countries have introduced different mech-
anisms to address these conflicts of interests between a director and the 
company. In Germany, loans can be provided to both the members of the 
management board and the supervisory board with the approval of the 
supervisory board.56 The member of the board of a Belgian company that 
directly or indirectly has a patrimonial interest related to a decision or 
transaction of the company should disclose this interest to the other direc-
tors, and in listed entities, abstain from the discussions and decision-tak-
ing process. The external auditor must report on the transaction.57 The 
general meeting of shareholders is not involved. The French approach 
related to loans, guarantees or provision of security to a director is 
straightforward. Any contract of this kind is null and void. All other “con-
 55 Section 190–191 UK Companies Act 2006. 
 56 Section 89 and 115 German Aktiengesetz.
 57 Article 523 Belgian Companies Code. 
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ventions” which includes all contracts between a director58 and a com-
pany must be submitted to the approval of the general meeting so share-
holders. In the Netherlands, there are no specific provisions regarding the 
allotment of loans to directors. Where appropriate, and unless the articles 
of association do not provide in an alternative procedure, the supervisory 
board represents the company in case a board member has a conflict of 
interest.59 However, the general meeting of shareholders has always a 
right to elect another person to represent the company.
Next to the right to approve transactions with directors, there are 
some non-current decisions that are considered of general importance and 
require shareholder approval in all countries. Next to the amendments of 
the articles of association, the conversion of the company and the liquida-
tion of the company need shareholder approval. In most countries there 
are specific quorum and majority rights applicable to take these types of 
decisions.
Other powers of the general meeting of shareholders are more 
country specific. If a company enters into an enterprise agreement, the 
German general meeting must approve the agreement with a majority 
vote of not less than 75 per cent of the represented share capital. In the 
Netherlands, the general meeting of shareholders must also approve simi-
lar agreements, like important joint ventures and the acquisition or dis-
posal of a participation in the capital of the company with a consideration 
of more than 1/3 of the value of the balance sheet.60 Companies listed on 
the London Stock Exchange must ensure that shareholders can vote on all 
major transactions. Transactions are categorised in classes according to 
their size related to the assets, profits and capital of the company.61 Trans-
actions that pass the threshold of 25 per cent must be accompanied with 
an explanatory circular to its shareholders and require prior approval in a 
general meeting.
Other powers of the general meetings in different countries are: (i) 
for Germany, the approval of transactions for which the supervisory board 
is withholding its consent whilst required according to the articles of as-
sociation; the appointment of auditors for examining matters of formation 
or management; conferring the management board to prepare any matter 
for which the general meeting is empowered; and the squeeze-out of mi-
nority shareholders upon a request of the majority shareholder; (ii) for 
France, the issuance of bonds is since 1994 the responsibility of the board 
of directors, but the articles of association can reserve this power to the 
 58 As well as the large shareholders of the company, the senior officers of the 
company and the controlling company (Article 225–38 French Commercial Code).
 59 Book 2:146 Dutch Civil Code.
 60 Book 2:107a Dutch Civil Code.
 61 See annex 1 to listing requirement 10 of the London Stock Exchange.
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general meeting of shareholders; (iii) for the Netherlands, the authorisa-
tion of the board to file for bankruptcy and the delegation of power to set 
the record date, (iv) for Belgium, the granting of rights to third parties 
that can influence the company’s capital or originating debt depending on 
the launch of a takeover bid;62 and (v) for the UK, the granting of politi-
cal donations of more than 5.000£.
Table 3: overview of “non-current” powers of general meetings in five 
Western-European countries
Belgium France Germany The Netherlands UK
non current items one tier two tier
approve substantial
property transaction with 
director or relative
x
approve loans, quasi loans 
with director x
approve contracts with 
board members and large 
shareholders*
x
Elect representative in 
case of conflict of interest 











company’s bylaws** x x x x x x
liquidation of the
company x x x x x x
Approve transaction for 
which articles require
supervisory board approv-
al and the latter withheld 
consent
x
Appointment of auditors 
for examining matters of 
formation or management
x
Delegation setting record 
date x x
 62 In particular different kinds of change of control clauses in loan agreements will 
require Belgian listed entities to acquire shareholder approval at the general meeting of 
shareholders.
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approve (larger) political 
donations x
granting third parties 
rights that influences the 
company’s capital or
originating debt dependent 
on take over bid
x
conversion of the
company x x x x x x
Require board preparation 
of any matter the
shareholder meeting is 
empowered to.
x
important joint ventures x x
file for bankruptcy x x
acquire or dispose of a 
participation in the capital 
with a value of more than 
1/3 of assets/ important 
transactions***
x x (LSE)
TOTAL OF ITEMS 4 5 8 8 8 7
Source: own research based on the analysis of the Belgian Companies Act, the French 
Commercial Code, the German Aktiengesetz and Handelsgesetzbuch, the Dutch Civil Code 
(Book 2) and the UK Companies Code 2006 and LSE listing requirements.
* owning more than 10%; **: includes many items like subdivide or consolidate share 
capital; ***: see listing requirements
3. THE GENERAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS IN ACTION
The aforementioned comparison illustrates that the general meet-
ings of shareholders in Western European countries have many common 
items on their agenda but also many different items. Overall we identified 
– other than the “European” empowerment of the general meeting of 
shareholders – between fourteen agenda topics for which the French gen-
eral meeting can take a decision up to twenty one items that German 
meetings can address. In an accompanying study, we collected the agen-
da, the minutes and the polls of the general meeting 2010 of more than 
150 blue chip companies in the five countries of which we studied the 
role and decision taking of the general meetings.63 Article 5 and 14 of the 
European Directive 2007/36/EC require the (timely) disclosure of the 
convocation with the agenda and minutes with the voting results and the 
 63 C. Van der Elst, Revisiting Shareholder Activism at AGMs: Voting Determinants 
of Large and Small Shareholders (July 16, 2011). ECGI – Finance Working Paper No. 
311/2011; Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 019/2011, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1886865, last visited 1 December 2011.
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proportion of the capital represented by the votes. The Directive had to be 
transposed by August 2009 but some Member States failed to timely 
transpose the Directive. As a consequence, not all companies disclosed all 
this information on their websites. Table 4 summarizes the findings. The 
individual agendas of the meetings provide the number of items the gen-
eral meeting had to approve or to reject (column three Table 4). On aver-
age, the general meetings have to approve approximately 17 items. In the 
Netherlands the total number of items is significantly smaller; in France, 
the total number is significantly larger. In Germany one meeting had to 
approve not less than fifty items, while the maximum number of items 
was only twenty three in the Netherlands. Even the smallest number can 
be found in the Netherlands: five items. In the UK, each meeting had to 
approve at least eleven items.
In order to better compare the agendas of the meetings and to ac-
count for the formal legal differences between the countries, we individu-
ally studied the agendas to assess the different agenda items. It is e.g. 
common that companies (re)elect more than one director or, like in France, 
authorize the chief executive officer to execute the decisions of the meet-
ing.64 In the fourth column, the (re)election of directors has been counted 
as one agenda item and the authorization has been excluded as agenda 
item. We have seen that French companies have to vote on the accounts, 
the consolidated accounts, the allocation of the income and the dividend, 
while only the accounts are laid before the meeting – and de facto voted 
– in the UK. We counted the approval of the accounts as one agenda item 
in the third column. French meetings have to elect a college of external 
auditors (and deputy members) which are counted as one item in the third 
column. These modifications reduce the list of resolutions for which an 
average general meeting has to vote considerably, but the relative ratio 
remains the same: the Dutch meeting has the least work, the French meet-
ing the most.
Board member (re)elections are omnipresent. Column five of Table 
4 presents the results of the average number of directors that each meet-
ing had to (re)elect. In two-tier board structures, the election of supervi-
sory board members is concentrated in specific years and only a limited 
number of members need to be (re)elected in the other years. In the UK, 
it is common that all or a large number of directors stand up for (re)elec-
tion. The average number of director elections is the highest in the UK. 
However, it was during a French general meeting that twenty directors 
stood up for (re)election.
 64 In other countries the approval of an agenda item implicitly includes the autho-
rization to execute the decision. From a more theoretical point of view the separation of 
the decision and the authorization to execute this decision has the advantage that it allows 
the meeting to choose the most reliable corporate officer. However as the agenda is set by 
the board of directors and the board provides the name of the officer, it risks that this of-
ficer is voted down and the execution is blocked. All French meetings approved almost 
unanimously the authorization of the corporate officer. 
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Column six of Table 4 provides the relative number of meetings 
that had to approve special resolutions or was combined with an extra-
ordinary meeting. In those cases column seven of Table 4 shows the aver-
age extra items the meeting need to approve. Extra-ordinary or special 
resolutions require in Belgium and France a separate general meeting for 
which a specific quorum and majorities are applicable. In the UK and 
Germany these decisions must be considered as ‘special’ resolutions for 
which a 75 per cent majority is required. The Netherlands is more flexi-
ble; only some decisions require a supermajority approval at Dutch AGMs 
if less than half of the capital is represented. All German and UK compa-
nies combine regular items with special resolutions. It is also common in 
France to combine the general meeting with an extra-ordinary meeting or 
to combine regular with special resolutions in the Netherlands. Less Bel-
gian companies organize extraordinary meetings, but when these compa-
nies combine the meetings, they list more special resolutions. One com-
pany had a list of eighteen extra-ordinary agenda items. Also French 
companies list a significant number of agenda items for which the ex-
traordinary meeting must take a decision. Again, the shareholders of 
Dutch companies are those that only need to take a limited number of 
decisions.
The last column of table 4 provides the average number of total 
voting rights that were present or represented. The minutes of the meeting 
either disclose the relative attendance of shares either the absolute number 
of voted shares (for, against and withheld). In the latter case this number 
is compared with the total number of issued shares with voting rights. 
The latter information is either disclosed in the minutes of the meeting 
either in the annual report of the company. The average and median vot-
ing turnout at general meetings is 60 per cent. The voting turnout of 80 
per cent of the meetings is above the threshold of 50 per cent and more 
than half of the meetings have an attendance of more than 60 per cent. A 
closer look at the voting turnouts in the different countries illustrate that 
the attendance is higher in the UK, with an average of approximately 67 
per cent, and lower in France, with 62 per cent. In Belgium, the average 
remains beneath the threshold of 50 per cent. Especially Belgian compa-
nies experience low voting turnouts. Four of the five lowest attendance 
outcomes are from Belgian meetings.
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Table 4: Summary of the role and duties of general meetings






















(BEL–20) 17 16,06 12,17 4,06 53% 8,56 49,10%
France 
(CAC–40) 37 20,16 13,27 5,32 89% 6,15 61,70%
Germany 








51 16,67 11,61 6,02 100% 4,27 66,70%
All
companies 153 16,82 11,75 4,33 90% 5,16 59,50%
Source: own research based on the hand collected agendas, minutes of the general meet-
ings and results of polls 2010 through the websites of the companies
It seems that all the different items that are on the agenda of gen-
eral meetings do not directly change the behavior of shareholders to at-
tend the general meetings. With more special resolutions to be voted Bel-
gian meetings experience low voting turnouts.65 However, the attendance 
of shareholders is only one technique to measure shareholder involve-
ment that can help to support legislators in their development of an ap-
propriate model for the division of power between the general meeting of 
shareholders and the board of directors.
We also collected the voting results of the most common items on 
the agenda of the meetings: the approval of the accounts, the discharge of 
the board, the remuneration of board members, and the election of board 
members. For comparability reasons the approval rates were calculated as 
the ratio of the votes for to the total votes including the votes withheld.66 
The results of the approval rates can be found in table 5. All accounts 
were approved with a supermajority rate of more than 99 per cent in all 
countries. Board members received their discharge with more than 97 per 
cent of the attending votes. The remuneration of the board and in particu-
 65 The results are not different for companies that combined the extraordinary 
meeting and the general meeting of shareholders and the companies that did not combine 
both meetings.
 66 In the UK the approval rate is calculated as the ratio of the votes for to the votes 
for and against with the exclusion of the votes withheld while companies in other coun-
tries generally include the votes withheld in the denominator.
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lar the remuneration report or remuneration system received slightly 
higher disapproval rates. In the UK on average 10 per cent of the attend-
ing shareholders voted against the report. All directors were (re)elected 
with more than 92 per cent of the votes, with the exception of the French 
board members, of which some experienced somewhat more opposition. 
Considering all items on the agenda of the general meetings, the lowest 
approval rates were above 80 per cent in four countries and still almost 75 
per cent in France. Often, the items that received the most opposition are 
the approval (of granting the right of the board of directors of) issuing 
new shares without the use of the preemptive rights.
It results from this part of the analysis that, whatever the kind of 
items that the general meeting has to approve, the opposition of share-
holder remains very modest and agenda items are seldom voted down.













Belgium 99,12% 98,12% 98,40% 96,49% 93,25%
France 99,34% 93,67% 86,65% 73,88%
Germany 99,92% 97,89% 97,30% 93,34% 92,29% 84,80%
The Netherlands 99,30% 99,07% 98,26% 97,09% 97,85% 84,42%
UK 99,19% 90,83% 94,42% 85,67%
all companies 99,36% 98,24% 97,65% 95,66% 91,69% 92,97% 83,33%
Source: own research based on the hand collected agendas, minutes of the general meet-
ings and results of polls 2010 through the websites of the companies.
Third, we address one specific meeting’s agenda item which expe-
rienced a recent legislative change in two countries. In Germany, the Ge-
setz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG) of 31 July 
200967 provided the general meeting with a right to vote on the system of 
remuneration of the board members. In Belgium, the Wet tot versterking 
van het deugdelijk bestuur bij de genoteerde vennootschappen68 of 6 
April 2010 requires the general meeting of shareholders to vote on the 
remuneration report with information on the remuneration policy and re-
muneration of the board and senior executive officers. In accordance with 
the German law, a large majority of the DAX–30 companies required the 
 67 The law on the adequacy of the remuneration of the management board, Bundes-
gesetzblatt I S. 2509 (No. 50).
 68 The law to enforce corporate governance of listed entities, Belgisch Staatsblad 
23 April 2010.
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general meeting of shareholders to vote on the adequacy of the remunera-
tion of the management board in 2010. Some Belgian companies provided 
their general meeting with a similar right of voting for the remuneration 
report during the general meeting of 2011, although the Belgian law only 
requires companies to put this item on the agenda of the general meeting 
from 2012 onwards.
Comparing the effects of these legal developments, we collected 
the attendance rate of shareholders at the general meeting that had to take 
a decision on the remuneration report/system and compared the results 
with the attendance rate of the shareholders at the general meeting of the 
previous year. For Germany, the attendance at the 2009 meeting is com-
pared with the attendance at the 2010 meeting. For Belgium, the years of 
the analysis are 2010 and 2011. The results of the analysis can be found 
in figure 1. At the 26 DAX–30 companies that approved the remuneration 
system in 2010, the average attendance was 57,0 per cent. It dropped 
from 58,2 per cent in 2009. Although the difference and decrease between 
2009 and 2010 is not statistically significant, 17 of the 26 companies ex-
perienced a decrease in the attendance at the meeting where the remu-
neration system was approved. For Belgium meetings the results are sim-
ilar. At 11 meetings where the remuneration report was placed on the 
agenda, only 4 of the companies experienced an increase in the attend-
ance of shareholders at the 2011 general meeting. Overall, the attendance 
at these 11 meetings increased from 46,1 per cent to 46,7 per cent, a non-
significant difference.
Figure 1 Attendance at German and Belgian meetings of the year during 
which the shareholders had to approve the remuneration system/report 
and the previous year
Source: own research based on the hand collected agendas, minutes of the general meet-
ings and results of polls of 2009 and 2010 for German companies and 2010 and 2011 for 
Belgian companies
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Although the sample of companies is limited, the results confirm 
the previous findings that shareholders do not significantly change their 
behavior vis-à-vis the (role and position of the) general meeting.
4. CONCLUSION
An appropriate division of power between the board of directors 
and shareholders of the company is quintessential to equilibrate the 
board’s responsibility to take discretionary business decisions and the 
shareholders rights to monitor board’s behavior. When corporate govern-
ance became fashionable, both the European and the national member 
states’ legislators refined corporate law and allocated more (monitoring) 
powers in the hands of the (general meeting of) shareholders. This study 
addressed the powers of the general meeting of shareholders in a com-
parative perspective. First, the powers that were provided in the European 
company law directives were briefly described. Next the “national” pow-
ers of (1) ordinary general meeting and (2) extra-ordinary meetings (or 
special resolutions) are addressed and compared and the restrictions to 
make use of these rights are provided. Third, the law in action is used to 
analyse the developments of shareholder rights and shareholder attend-
ance and voting at general meetings of listed entities. Three different 
techniques are presented to assess how shareholders practice and make 
use of the powers of the general meeting of shareholders. First the impor-
tance of the general meeting of shareholders and the importance of the 
agenda items is used in comparison with the attendance of shareholders. 
We found no significant relationship between the number of items or the 
importance of items to be voted at the meeting and the attendance of the 
shareholders. Next we studied the voting results of a number of items on 
the agenda. All items received overwhelming support of the shareholders. 
Only exceptionally an agenda item is voted down. Third, we studied the 
interest of shareholders in say-on-pay and compared shareholder partici-
pation in Germany and Belgium when the remuneration report or system 
was an agenda item and the previous year when it was not an item. There 
is no evidence that the remuneration issue influences shareholders’ at-
tendance behavior.
In its Green Paper on corporate governance the European Commis-
sion recognized the importance of shareholder voting improving long-
term value creation.69 Our research sheds doubt on the current role of 
shareholder voting in listed companies as a strategic governance tool for 
this type of value creation. A large part of the shareholders are either free 
 69 European Commission, Green Paper – The EU Corporate Governance Frame-
work, Brussels, 5 April 2011, COM(2011) 164 final, 24.
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riding or apathetic. Second, shareholders that attend the meetings support 
as good as all agenda items. Third, legislators struggle with the delinea-
tion of powers of the shareholders and the board as table 2 and 3 illus-
trates. It is more than likely that more serious consideration is necessary 
to optimize the role of general meetings. It seems unlikely that the sug-
gestion to disclose the voting policies of investors70 can be sufficient to 
reach the goal of a “stewardship committed” shareholder. We therefore 
would like to make a plea for an in depth analysis of the needs and re-
quirements of shareholders to participate in the decision making process 
of the company and assess the alignment of their desires with the Euro-
pean view on the stakeholder interests in the company, before launching 
new initiatives.
 70 Ibid., 12.
